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Abstract	
Pragmatism	about	quantum	mechanics	provides	an	attractive	approach	to	the	question	of	what	
quantum	mechanics	says.	However,	the	conclusions	reached	by	pragmatists	concerning	the	
content	of	quantum	mechanics	cannot	be	squared	with	the	way	that	physicists	use	quantum	
mechanics	to	describe	physical	systems.	In	particular,	attention	to	actual	use	results	in	ascribing	
content	to	claims	about	physical	systems	over	a	much	wider	range	of	contexts	than	
countenanced	by	recent	pragmatists.	The	resulting	account	of	the	content	of	quantum	
mechanics	is	much	closer	to	quantum	logic,	and	threatens	the	pragmatist	conclusion	that	
quantum	mechanics	requires	no	supplementation.	
	
1.	Introduction	
Quantum	mechanics	is,	notoriously,	a	theory	in	need	of	interpretation.	But	there	is	very	little	
agreement	on	what	kind	of	interpretation	it	needs.	That	is,	there	is	very	little	agreement	
concerning	what	the	foundational	problems	of	quantum	mechanics	are,	and	without	such	
agreement,	there	is	little	hope	for	a	consensus	concerning	what	an	acceptable	solution	to	the	
problems	might	look	like.	
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Here	is	a	way	to	divide	up	the	territory.	We	can	distinguish	between	descriptive	and	
normative	questions	concerning	quantum	mechanics.	Descriptive	questions	concern	what	
quantum	mechanics	says—the	content	of	the	theory,	as	expressed	in	textbooks	and	used	in	
labs.	Normative	questions	concern	what	quantum	mechanics	should	say—and	in	particular,	
whether	it	should	say	something	different	from	what	it	actually	does	say.	
	 All	parties	to	the	debates	over	the	foundations	of	quantum	mechanics	would	agree,	I	
think,	that	there	is	a	legitimate	descriptive	question	concerning	the	content	of	quantum	
mechanics.	Even	those	philosophers	and	physicists	who	think	that	quantum	mechanics	wears	
its	interpretation	on	its	sleeve	at	least	feel	the	need	to	correct	the	mistaken	impressions	of	
other	philosophers	and	physicists	concerning	what	quantum	mechanics	says.	The	normative	
question	presupposes	an	answer	to	the	descriptive	one:	some	think	quantum	mechanics	is	just	
fine	the	way	it	is,	others	contend	that	it	needs	to	be	replaced	or	supplemented	with	something	
radically	different,	and	in	large	part	this	difference	in	attitude	depends	on	prior	differences	
concerning	the	answer	to	the	descriptive	question.		
	 As	an	illustration,	consider	a	fairly	standard	narrative	concerning	the	descriptive	and	
normative	questions.	Descriptively	speaking,	quantum	mechanics	depends	on	a	distinction	
between	measurements	and	non-measurements:	measurements	follow	one	dynamical	law,	the	
collapse	dynamics,	and	non-measurements	follow	a	different	dynamical	law,	the	Schrödinger	
dynamics.	Since	these	two	dynamical	processes	are	incompatible,	a	precise	formulation	of	
quantum	mechanics	requires	a	precise	dividing	line	between	measurements	and	non-
measurements.	Quantum	mechanics	nowhere	provides	such	a	thing—and	indeed,	it	seems	
highly	unlikely	that	a	term	like	“measurement”	could	be	given	a	physically	precise	definition.	So	
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descriptively	speaking,	quantum	mechanics	is	inadequate	as	a	physical	theory.	On	the	basis	of	
this	measurement	problem,	Bell	(2004,	213–231)	recommends	replacing	quantum	mechanics	
with	either	a	pilot-wave	theory	or	a	spontaneous	collapse	theory.	For	similar	reasons,	Wallace	
(2012,	35)	recommends	replacing	quantum	mechanics	with	a	many-worlds	theory.1	
	 But	not	everybody	concurs.	There	are	alternative	narratives	according	to	which	
quantum	mechanics,	descriptively	speaking,	is	just	fine	as	it	is,	and	hence	there	is	no	normative	
pressure	to	supplement	or	replace	it.	One	prominent	version	proceeds	from	the	quantum	logic	
of	von	Neumann	(1936)	and	Putnam	(1975)	through	to	the	quantum	information	theory	of	Bub	
(2016).	According	to	this	approach,	quantum	mechanics	describes	a	non-classical	event	space—
in	terms	of	truth	values,	a	non-Boolean	algebra,	and	in	terms	of	probability	ascriptions,	a	non-
simplex	distribution.	No-go	theorems	(arguably)	show	that	it	is	impossible	to	construct	a	set	of	
events	obeying	classical	Boolean	logic	or	classical	Kolmogorov	probability	that	reproduces	the	
empirical	predictions	of	quantum	mechanics.	The	implication	is	that	in	quantum	mechanics	we	
have	discovered	something	important	about	the	fundamental	event	structure	of	the	world.	
Seeking	to	replace	or	supplement	quantum	mechanics	with	a	theory	obeying	classical	logic	and	
classical	probability	theory	amounts	to	a	quixotic	attempt	to	impose	a	structure	on	the	world	
that	it	manifestly	does	not	have	(Bub	2016,	222).	The	measurement	problem,	on	this	account,	
results	from	a	mistaken	demand	for	a	dynamical	explanation	of	the	individual	events	in	the	
quantum	structure,	when	no	such	explanation	is	available	(Bub	2016,	223)	
																																																						
1	Wallace	takes	the	many-worlds	theory	to	be	a	precise	statement	of	the	content	of	quantum	
mechanics,	rather	than	a	replacement	for	it.	I	take	up	the	question	of	whether	the	many-worlds	
structure	is	present	in	quantum	mechanics	as	it	stands	in	section	2.			
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	 This	fundamental	difference	of	opinion—between	those	who	take	the	measurement	
problem	seriously	and	those	who	regard	it	as	a	pseudo-problem—continues	to	divide	the	
foundations	of	physics	community	today.	Hence	the	descriptive	question—the	question	of	what	
quantum	mechanics	actually	says—remains	a	pressing	one.	In	this	paper,	I	argue	for	a	particular	
way	of	approaching	the	descriptive	question.	The	methodology	is	the	pragmatist	one	of	Healey	
(2012;	2017)	and	Friederich	(2015),	but	the	answer	to	the	descriptive	question	that	results	from	
following	this	methodology,	I	argue,	differs	in	an	important	way	from	the	answers	that	Healey	
and	Friederich	give.	I	conclude	by	assessing	the	consequences	of	this	answer	to	the	descriptive	
question	for	the	normative	question.	
	
2.	The	descriptive	question	
So	how	should	we	approach	the	descriptive	question?	Consider	a	straightforward	realist	
approach	to	the	content	of	scientific	theories.	A	theory,	at	least	in	physics,	is	typically	expressed	
using	a	particular	mathematical	structure.	The	state	of	a	physical	system	is	generally	identified	
with	a	mathematical	entity	that	resides	in	a	particular	abstract	space,	and	the	dynamics	of	the	
theory	tell	us	how	that	state	evolves	over	time.	So,	for	example,	in	many	applications	of	
classical	mechanics,	the	state	of	a	physical	system	can	be	represented	by	a	set	of	vectors	in	a	
three-dimensional	Euclidean	space,	and	the	dynamical	laws	of	Newtonian	mechanics	tell	us	
how	the	set	of	vectors	evolves	over	time.	The	interpretation	of	the	mathematics	is	fairly	
straightforward:	the	vectors	represent	the	positions	and	momenta	of	point-like	particles,	and	
classical	mechanics	tells	us	how	the	properties	of	the	particles	change.	
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Such	an	approach	can	equally	be	applied	to	quantum	mechanics	(Albert	1996).	
According	to	quantum	mechanics,	the	state	of	a	physical	system	is	identified	with	a	complex-
valued	function	defined	on	a	configuration	space—a	space	with	three	dimensions	for	each	
particle	in	the	system.	A	dynamical	law,	the	Schrödinger	equation,	tells	us	how	this	function,	
the	wave-function,	changes	over	time.	Then	by	analogy	with	classical	mechanics,	the	wave-
function	must	be	a	representation	of	the	physical	properties	of	the	quantum	system	as	they	
change	over	time.	
The	continuity	with	classical	mechanics	in	the	above	account	is	attractive,	but	there	are	
surprising	consequences.	For	an	N-particle	system,	the	wave-function	is	defined	over	a	3N-
dimensional	configuration	space,	and	it	cannot	be	represented	without	loss	in	a	three-
dimensional	space.	This	has	led	some	to	conclude	that	a	straightforward	realist	reading	of	
quantum	mechanics	shows	that	the	three-dimensionality	of	our	physical	world	is	illusory	(Albert	
1996).	Furthermore,	if	we	model	a	measurement	using	quantum	mechanics,	the	wave-function	
ends	up	with	components	corresponding	to	each	possible	outcome	of	the	measurement—not	
just	one	outcome,	as	is	the	case	classically.	This	leads	Everettians	like	Wallace	(2012)	to	
conclude	that	a	straightforward	realist	reading	of	quantum	mechanics	shows	that	every	
possible	outcome	of	a	measurement	actually	occurs.	
These	conclusions	might	be	right,	but	do	they	simply	follow	from	close	attention	to	the	
structure	of	quantum	mechanics?	There	are	reasons	to	be	suspicious.	As	Healey	(2017,	116)	
notes,	conclusions	of	this	kind	depend	on	the	assumption	that	the	wave-function	plays	the	
same	descriptive	role	in	quantum	mechanics	as	the	position-momentum	vectors	play	in	
classical	mechanics.	If	this	assumption	is	itself	up	for	grabs	in	the	interpretation	of	quantum	
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mechanics,	then	neither	of	these	conclusions	is	warranted.	But	how	do	we	adjudicate	the	
question	of	whether	the	wave-function	describes	physical	systems	or	whether	it	has	some	
other,	non-descriptive	role?	Is	there	a	metaphysically	neutral	methodology	that	could	be	used	
to	answer	this	question?	Healey	(2012;	2017)	and	Friederich	(2015)	think	that	there	is.	
	
3.	Pragmatism	
Consider	an	analogy.	“Stealing	is	bad”	has	the	same	grammatical	structure	as	“Cherries	are	
red”.	But	it	is	far	from	clear	that	both	sentences	should	be	taken	as	descriptive.	In	particular,	
badness,	taken	as	a	property	of	actions,	seems	like	a	queer	kind	of	property,	imperceptible	and	
disconnected	from	the	other	properties	of	the	action.	Expressivists	seek	to	dissolve	the	problem	
of	the	nature	of	badness	by	claiming	that	a	sentence	like	“Stealing	is	bad”	should	be	taken	as	
expressive	rather	than	descriptive—as	expressing	our	attitude	towards	stealing.	Pragmatists	
further	coopt	expressivism	as	a	variety	of	pragmatism	(Price	2011,	9).	Pragmatists	stress	the	
variety	of	uses	of	language,	noting	that	sentences	with	superficially	similar	form	can	be	used	in	
radically	different	ways.	“Cherries	are	red”	is	used	to	describe	a	class	of	objects,	whereas	
“Stealing	is	bad”	is	used	to	express	our	attitude	towards	a	class	of	actions.	
	 Pragmatism,	then,	enjoins	us	to	pay	close	attention	to	how	a	sentence	is	used	in	order	
to	find	out	what	it	means.	Healey	(2012;	2017)	and	Friederich	(2015)	each	suggest	that	the	
pragmatist	approach	provides	us	with	a	metaphysically	neutral	methodology	for	probing	the	
content	of	quantum	mechanics.	That	is,	we	can	look	at	how	various	quantum	mechanical	claims	
are	used	by	physicists	in	order	to	determine	what	those	claims	mean.	This	strikes	me	as	a	
welcome	suggestion.	In	the	rest	of	this	section	I	present	the	conclusions	of	their	pragmatist	
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inquiries;	in	the	next,	I	consider	whether	the	language	use	of	physicists	actually	supports	those	
conclusions.	
	 Healey	(2012)	distinguishes	between	quantum	claims	and	non-quantum	magnitude	
claims.	The	former	explicitly	mention	quantum	states,	quantum	probabilities,	or	other	novel	
elements	of	the	theory	of	quantum	mechanics.	The	latter	are	claims	about	the	magnitude	of	a	
physical	quantity	that	do	not	involve	quantum	states,	quantum	probabilities	etc.	In	keeping	
with	the	pragmatist	methodology,	Healey	bases	this	distinction	on	the	way	the	two	kinds	of	
claims	are	used.	Non-quantum	magnitude	claims	are	used	in	a	straightforwardly	descriptive	
way.	But	quantum	claims	are	used	in	a	different	way:	they	are	used,	not	to	describe	a	system,	
but	to	prescribe	a	user’s	degrees	of	belief	in	various	non-quantum	magnitude	claims.	
	 As	an	example,	Healey	appeals	to	the	Interference	experiments	of	Juffmann	et	al.	
(2009),	in	which	C60	molecules	are	passed	through	an	array	of	slits	and	then	deposited	on	a	
silicon	surface.	To	derive	quantum	mechanical	predictions	for	this	experimental	arrangement,	
quantum	states	are	ascribed	to	C60	molecules.	That	is,	quantum	claims	of	the	form	“The	
molecule	has	state	|yñ”	are	used,	via	the	Born	rule,	to	ascribe	probabilities	to	claims	concerning	
the	various	possible	locations	of	the	molecules	on	the	silicon	surface.	These	latter	claims—of	
the	form	“The	molecule	is	located	in	region	R”—are	non-quantum	magnitude	claims.	The	job	of	
the	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	is	to	describe	the	physical	system,	but	the	job	of	the	
quantum	claims	is	to	prescribe	degrees	of	belief	in	the	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	for	an	
appropriately	situated	observer.	In	this	respect	Healey’s	approach	is	like	the	expressivist’s	in	
ethics:	claims	that	have	superficially	similar	grammatical	forms	have	very	different	functions.	
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Another	important	strand	in	the	pragmatist	approach	concerns	the	role	of	decoherence.	
After	the	C60	molecule	hits	the	silicon	surface,	complicated	interactions	with	the	surface	mean	
that	the	state	of	the	molecule-environment	system	becomes	approximately	diagonal	when	
written	as	a	density	matrix	in	the	position	basis.	This	in	turn	insures	that	the	probabilities	
ascribed	by	the	Born	rule	to	various	claims	about	the	molecule’s	position	closely	obey	the	
probability	axioms.	But	before	the	molecule	encounters	the	silicon	surface,	its	state	is	a	
coherent	superposition—a	state	that	is	not	even	approximately	diagonal,	and	for	which	the	
Born	rule	does	not	ascribe	probabilities	to	location	claims	that	closely	obey	the	probability	
axioms.	For	such	a	state,	the	Born	rule	does	not	prescribe	appropriate	degrees	of	belief	in	the	
non-quantum	location	claims,	and	so	assertion	of	such	claims	prior	to	decoherence	is	not	
licensed	by	quantum	mechanics.	Decoherence,	then	provides	a	demarcation	between	situations	
in	which	it	is	appropriate	to	have	a	well-defined	degree	of	belief	in	a	non-quantum	magnitude	
claim,	and	situations	in	which	it	is	not.	
The	central	finding	of	the	Healey-Friederich	pragmatist	approach	is	that	attention	to	the	
use	of	quantum	mechanical	language	shows	that	claims	about	the	quantum	state	of	a	system	
are	not	used	to	describe	that	system.	Hence,	we	should	not	think	of	the	wave-function	as	a	
representation	of	the	physical	properties	of	the	quantum	system	as	they	change	over	time.	This	
perspective	has	the	advantage	that	the	measurement	problem	does	not	arise:	if	the	wave-
function	doesn’t	represent	the	system,	then	we	don’t	have	to	worry	that	the	dynamical	laws	for	
wave-function	evolution	are	different	for	measurements	and	non-measurements.	In	fact,	if	the	
quantum	state	is	prescriptive,	then	the	difference	between	measurements	and	non-
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measurements	arises	quite	naturally:	the	results	of	measurements	have	a	direct	and	obvious	
influence	on	what	you	should	believe.	
Hence	the	pragmatist	approach	provides	a	clear	answer	to	the	descriptive	question:	
quantum	mechanics,	in	itself,	says	nothing	about	the	world.	As	Healey	(2017,	12)	puts	it,	
“quantum	theory	has	no	physical	ontology”.	Rather,	quantum	mechanics	tells	us	what	to	
believe	about	non-quantum	ontology—about	particles,	or	in	the	case	of	quantum	field	theory,	
about	fields.	Furthermore,	this	answer	to	the	descriptive	question	suggests	an	answer	to	the	
normative	question:	since	the	measurement	problem	doesn’t	arise,	there	is	no	motivation	for	
supplementing	or	replacing	quantum	mechanics	with	something	else.	
	
4.	Actual	use,	counterfactual	content	
Thus	far,	I	have	said	little	about	the	evidence	that	backs	up	Healey’s	claims	about	how	quantum	
claims	and	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	are	used.	Indeed,	direct	evidence	from	the	language	
use	of	physicists	is	likely	to	be	unenlightening:	that	a	claim	is	asserted	in	a	given	context	
provides	no	direct	evidence	concerning	whether	its	content	is	descriptive	or	prescriptive.	
	 To	fill	this	gap,	Healey	appeals	to	an	inferentialist	account	of	the	link	between	use	and	
meaning	derived	from	the	work	of	Robert	Brandom	(2000):	the	meaning	of	a	claim	is	identified	
with	the	set	of	material	inferences	it	licenses.	So	by	looking	at	the	way	a	claim	is	used	in	
licensing	inferences,	we	can	gain	evidence	about	what	it	means.	And	here	the	distinction	
between	prescriptive	quantum	claims	and	descriptive	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	seems	to	
be	well	motivated.	In	the	practice	of	physics,	a	claim	about	the	quantum	state	of	a	system	is	
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used	to	infer	Born	probabilities,	and	nothing	more.	If	Born	probabilities	are	taken	to	be	rational	
degrees	of	belief,	then	the	prescriptive	content	of	a	quantum	claim	exhausts	its	meaning.	
A	non-quantum	magnitude	claim,	on	the	other	hand,	can	license	a	wide	variety	of	
inferences.	From	the	claim	that	a	C60	molecule	is	located	in	a	particular	region	of	the	silicon	
surface,	we	can	infer	that	an	electron	microscope	will	produce	an	image	of	the	molecule	if	
directed	at	that	region	(Juffmann	et	al.	2009,	2).	We	can	infer	that	if	the	silicon	surface	is	left	
untouched	for	two	weeks,	the	C60	molecule	will	remain	in	the	same	place	(Juffmann	et	al.	2009,	
2).	Under	suitable	conditions,	we	can	infer	that	the	C60	molecule	will	emits	photons;	under	
different	conditions,	that	it	will	act	as	a	nucleation	core	for	molecular	growth	(Juffmann	et	al.	
2009,	3).	In	other	words,	the	inferences	licensed	by	the	non-quantum	magnitude	claim	support	
the	interpretation	that	the	meaning	of	the	claim	is	descriptive	rather	than	merely	prescriptive.2	
So	there	is	a	good	case	to	be	made,	I	think,	that	actual	use	supports	the	distinction	
between	prescriptive	quantum	claims	and	descriptive	non-quantum	magnitude	claims.	But	
there	is	a	further	strand	to	the	Healey-Friederich	interpretation,	namely	that	non-quantum	
magnitude	claims	are	only	licensed	after	decoherence.	This	claim,	I	think,	does	not	stand	up	so	
well	to	scrutiny.	
Consider	C60	interference	again.	After	the	molecule	has	adhered	to	the	silicon	surface,	
the	state	of	the	molecule	is	decoherent,	and	the	claim	that	the	molecule	has	a	particular	
																																																						
2	There	is	a	sense	in	which	the	meaning	of	any	claim	is	prescriptive	according	to	the	
inferentialist	program:	the	claim	about	the	location	of	the	molecule	licenses	an	inference	to	a	
certain	degree	of	belief	that	the	electron	microscope	will	produce	an	image	of	it.	But	still,	there	
is	a	reasonable	distinction	here:	the	quantum	claim	licenses	inferences	only	via	the	Born	rule,	
whereas	the	non-quantum	magnitude	claim	licenses	inferences	via	a	huge	variety	of	schema	
typical	of	small	physical	objects.	The	latter	is	just	what	it	is	for	a	claim	to	be	descriptive.	
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location	is	licensed—that	is,	it	is	appropriate	to	associate	a	particular	degree	of	belief	with	the	
claim,	and	if	that	degree	of	belief	is	high	enough,	it	is	appropriate	to	assert	the	claim.	But	
before	the	molecule	has	adhered	to	the	silicon	surface,	the	state	of	the	molecule	is	coherent,	
and	no	claim	about	the	location	of	the	molecule	is	licensed—it	is	not	appropriate	to	associate	a	
degree	of	belief	with	such	a	claim,	or	to	assert	it.	Similar	considerations	apply	to	properties	
other	than	location.	
This	seems	to	fly	in	the	face	of	actual	use.	For	example,	in	the	description	of	the	C60	
interference	experiment,	Juffmann	et	al.	(2009,	2)	assert	that	“all	transmitted	particles	arrive	
with	the	same	speed,”	and	“about	110cm	behind	the	source,	the	molecules	encounter	the	first	
diffraction	grating,”	apparently	ascribing	both	speed	and	location	to	C60	molecules	prior	to	
decoherence.	This	doesn’t	seem	to	be	an	isolated	incident:	physicists	routinely	talk	of	
preparing,	selecting,	spraying,	shooting	and	trapping	particles,	ions	and	molecules,	and	this	talk	
typically	involves	making	claims	about	these	objects	prior	to	any	eventual	decoherence.	
It	is	possible,	of	course,	that	this	is	just	“loose	talk”,	or	an	indirect	way	of	making	claims	
about	the	quantum	state	of	the	systems	concerned.	But	given	the	frequency	of	such	claims,	and	
given	the	reliance	of	the	pragmatist	methodology	on	use,	this	seems	like	a	shaky	game	to	play.	
It	would	be	better,	all	things	considered,	if	such	claims	could	be	accommodated	within	the	
pragmatist	interpretation,	rather	than	explained	away	as	anomalies.	
But	there	are	obvious	barriers	to	licensing	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	prior	to	
decoherence.	As	Friederich	(2015,	79)	notes,	the	Born	rule	is	only	“reliable”	when	applied	to	
decoherent	states,	in	the	sense	that	only	for	such	states	are	the	numbers	it	produces	
guaranteed	to	closely	obey	the	probability	axioms.	Given	some	reasonable	assumptions	about	
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rationality,	it	is	plausible	that	numbers	that	do	not	closely	obey	the	probability	axioms	could	
not	be	rational	degrees	of	belief.		Furthermore,	Healey	argues	that	asserting	a	non-quantum	
magnitude	claim	prior	to	decoherence	is	likely	to	be	misleading.	For	example,	suppose	one	
asserts	(with	Juffmann	et	al.)	that	“about	110cm	behind	the	source,	the	molecules	encounter	
the	first	diffraction	grating.”	One	might	infer	from	this	that	each	molecule	passes	through	
exactly	one	slit	in	the	grating,	and	hence	that	the	presence	of	the	other	slits	is	irrelevant,	and	
hence	that	there	is	no	possibility	of	interference	(Healey	2012,	745).	
So	the	pragmatist	approach	seems	to	face	a	dilemma:	either	it	fails	to	accommodate	the	
actual	language	use	of	physicists,	or	it	licenses	misleading	assertions	and	irrational	degrees	of	
belief.	Isn’t	there	another	way?	I	think	there	is.	Consider	a	mundane	claim	like	“There	is	beer	in	
the	fridge.”	In	typical	contexts,	an	assertion	of	this	claim	licenses	the	inference	that	if	you	were	
to	go	to	the	fridge	and	open	the	door,	you	could	take	a	beer	and	drink	it.	Of	course,	you	might	
not	actually	do	this;	maybe	you	don’t	want	a	beer.	That	is,	the	inference	here	is	a	
counterfactual	one.	A	good	deal	of	the	inferential	content	of	our	assertions	has	this	
counterfactual	character.	
Now	return	to	the	quantum	context.	Consider	again	the	claim	that	“about	110cm	
behind	the	source,	the	molecules	encounter	the	first	diffraction	grating.”	What	content	could	
that	claim	have?	If	we	broaden	the	notion	of	inferential	content	to	include	counterfactual	
inferences,	then	the	content	seems	fairly	clear:	if	we	were	to	replace	the	first	diffraction	grating	
with	a	detector	taking	up	the	same	region	of	space,	then	the	Born	rule	would	ascribe	a	degree	
of	belief	close	to	1	to	detecting	the	molecules.	
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How	does	the	inclusion	of	counterfactual	content	avoid	the	barriers	to	licensing	non-
quantum	magnitude	claims	prior	to	decoherence?	Note	that	the	counterfactual	content	of	the	
claim	about	the	molecules	involves	a	counterfactual	intervention	on	the	system—a	
counterfactual	measurement.	The	counterfactual	measurement	induces	counterfactual	
decoherence.	The	Born	probabilities	are	conditional	on	this	intervention	and	the	associated	
decoherence,	so	the	Born	probabilities	for	various	position	claims	concerning	the	molecules	are	
not,	after	all,	unreliable,	in	the	sense	of	violating	the	probability	axioms.	
Neither	should	there	be	any	danger	of	being	misled	by	an	assertion	that	the	C60	
molecules	encounter	the	grating,	because	the	counterfactual	conditions	implicit	in	the	content	
of	that	assertion	are	distinct	from	the	conditions	that	actually	obtain	in	the	apparatus.	That	you	
could	detect	the	molecules	at	the	diffraction	grating,	given	a	different	experimental	
arrangement,	doesn’t	license	the	inference	that	there	is	no	interference,	given	the	actual	
experimental	arrangement.	Admittedly,	though,	this	amounts	to	a	weakening	of	the	content	of	
position	claims	from	the	classical	case,	as	spelled	out	in	the	next	section.	
	
5.	A	happy	convergence?	
I	have	argued	that	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	have	assertible	content	in	a	far	wider	range	
of	contexts	than	countenanced	by	Healey	or	Friederich.	If	there	is	some	counterfactual	
intervention	on	a	system	that	would	produce	decoherence	in	the	basis	defined	by	a	given	
observable,	then	claims	about	the	values	of	that	observable	have	content.	And	since	
counterfactual	interventions	only	have	to	be	realizable	in	principle,	this	means	that	claims	
about	the	value	of	an	observable	for	a	system	generally	have	content,	whether	or	not	the	
	 14	
system	actually	decoheres	in	the	basis	defined	by	that	observable.	This	has	the	welcome	
consequence	that	the	frequent	assertions	made	by	physicists	about	the	properties	of	systems	
prior	to	decoherence	are	contentful.	
	 A	potential	cost	of	such	permissiveness	about	content	is	that	the	structure	of	this	
content	is,	in	general,	non-Boolean.	Consider	again	a	C60	molecule	that	is	approaching	the	first	
diffraction	grating,	and	consider	an	assertion	of	“The	molecule	passes	through	the	leftmost	
slit”.	This	assertion	has	content,	on	the	proposed	view,	because	in	principle	there	is	an	
intervention	on	the	system	that	would	produce	decoherence	in	a	basis	defined	by	an	
observable	that	distinguishes	which	slit	the	molecule	passes	through.	Still,	assertion	of	the	
claim	would	not	be	appropriate,	simply	because	there	are	many	slits	in	the	grating,	so	the	Born	
rule	ascribes	it	a	low	probability.	The	same	goes	for	every	other	slit	in	the	grating.	Nevertheless,	
the	assertion	that	“The	molecule	passes	through	the	leftmost	slit,	or	the	second	to	the	left,	
or…”	is	assertible,	since	the	Born	rule	ascribes	it	a	probability	close	to	1.	The	disjunction	is	
assertible,	but	none	of	the	disjuncts	is	assertible.	Since	assertibility	is	a	surrogate	for	truth	in	
the	pragmatist	context,	this	is	equivalent	to	saying	that	the	disjunction	is	true,	but	none	of	the	
disjuncts	is	true.	
	 One	might	take	this	to	be	unacceptable	on	the	pragmatist	view—especially	if	you	
endorse	an	inferentialist	pragmatism,	as	Healey	does.	From	a	disjunctive	claim	you	can	
straightforwardly	infer	that	at	least	one	of	the	disjuncts	is	true.	If	the	content	of	a	claim	is	
identified	with	the	inferences	that	it	licenses,	then	part	of	the	meaning	of	the	disjunctive	claim	
about	the	C60	molecule	is	that	some	assertion	of	the	form	“The	molecule	went	through	slit	x”	is	
true.	Hence	my	proposal	about	content	threatens	to	violate	the	inferentialist	account	of	
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meaning.	The	pragmatist	interpretation	of	Healey	and	Friederich	avoids	this	problem	by	
insisting	that	claims	about	systems	have	meaning	only	after	suitable	decoherence.	
	 Of	course,	pragmatism	is	not	necessarily	tied	to	an	inferentialist	account	of	meaning.	
But	even	given	inferentialism,	there	is	arguably	no	real	problem	here.	Physicists	are	selective	in	
the	inferences	they	draw:	from	the	disjunctive	claim,	they	don’t	infer	that	the	C60	molecule	goes	
through	some	particular	slit,	so	they	don’t	infer	a	lack	of	interference.	But	they	do	infer	that	the	
molecule	will	arrive	at	the	silicon	surface,	that	it	might	radiate	a	photon	in	flight,	and	so	forth.	
That	is,	the	inferences	drawn	by	physicists	from	their	claims	about	pre-decoherent	systems	
suggest	that	the	non-Boolean	structure	of	those	claims	is	already	built	in	to	the	meanings	
associated	with	those	claims	and	revealed	in	inference.	
	 This	suggests	that	close	attention	to	the	way	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	are	
actually	used	leads	to	a	happy	convergence	between	pragmatism	and	the	quantum	logical	
approach.	Physicists	assert	claims	about	particles	even	when	the	state	does	not	decohere,	and	
such	claims	seem	to	be	meaningful.	But	physicists	are	not	inclined	on	that	basis	to	draw	all	the	
inferences	that	a	full	Boolean	structure	to	their	claims	would	license.	Quantum	mechanics	
apparently	weakens	the	meaning	of	many	claims	about	pre-decoherent	physical	systems,	but	
without	rendering	those	claims	meaningless.	
	 	
6.	The	normative	question	
As	a	methodology	for	addressing	the	descriptive	question	of	the	content	of	quantum	
mechanics,	the	pragmatist	approach	seems	entirely	appropriate:	look	to	the	use	of	physicists	to	
determine	what	the	various	claims	involved	in	the	theory	mean.	At	the	hands	of	Healey	and	
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Friederich,	this	approach	yields	the	important	insight	that	while	non-quantum	magnitude	
claims	are	used	to	describe	physical	system,	quantum	claims	are	used	to	prescribe	appropriate	
degrees	of	belief	in	non-quantum	magnitude	claims.	But	Healey	and	Friederich	go	further,	in	
limiting	the	assertibility	of	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	to	contexts	in	which	the	quantum	
state	is	decoherent	in	the	relevant	basis.	This,	I	have	argued,	cannot	be	squared	with	the	actual	
use	of	such	claims.	I	propose	instead	that	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	generally	have	well-
defined	content,	understood	in	terms	of	a	counterfactual	intervention	on	the	system.	This	
change	to	the	pragmatist	approach	means	that	it	ends	up	looking	a	lot	like	the	quantum	logical	
approach	that	preceded	it.	Indeed,	the	pragmatist	approach	might	be	regarded	as	a	justification	
for	quantum	logical	claims	concerning	the	content	of	quantum	mechanics.	
	 But	where	does	all	this	leave	the	normative	question	concerning	whether	quantum	
mechanics	is	fine	as	it	is,	or	whether	it	should	be	supplemented	or	replaced?	Healey	and	
Friederich	argue	that	quantum	mechanics	is	fine	as	it	is:	if	quantum	claims	do	not	describe	
physical	systems,	then	there	can	be	no	conflict	between	the	way	that	quantum	mechanics	
describes	systems	during	measurements	and	the	way	it	describes	them	during	non-
measurements.	If	there	is	no	measurement	problem,	then	there	is	no	motivation	to	replace	
such	a	successful	theory.	If,	as	Healey	(2017,	12)	maintains,	quantum	theory	“states	no	facts	
about	physical	objects	or	events,”	then	there	can	be	no	requirement	that	we	come	up	with	an	
explanation	of	quantum	facts	and	events.	
	 However,	I	have	suggested	that	quantum	theory	has	more	content	than	the	pragmatists	
countenance.	In	one	sense,	I	agree	that	quantum	theory	states	no	facts:	a	quantum	claim,	such	
as	the	attribution	of	a	quantum	state	to	a	system,	is	not	a	description.	But	in	another	sense,	
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there	are	distinctive	quantum	facts,	or	at	least	facts	with	a	distinctive	quantum	structure:	non-
quantum	magnitude	claims	about	pre-decoherent	systems	exhibit	the	non-Boolean	structure	
characteristic	of	quantum	mechanics.	This	is	the	sense	in	which	quantum	logic	gets	things	right.	
Notably,	though,	the	proponents	of	quantum	logic	also	often	take	the	view	that	
quantum	logic	dissolves	the	measurement	problem	(e.g.	Putnam	1975,	186).	But	this	
dissolution	is	widely	regarded	to	be	a	failure	(e.g.	Bacciagaluppi	2009,	65)	Once	one	has	
admitted	that	the	structure	of	true	(i.e.	assertible)	claims	for	a	quantum	system	is	non-Boolean,	
the	question	of	how	the	world	manages	to	instantiate	this	structure	becomes	legitimate	and	
pressing.	A	denial	that	any	explanation	is	required	looks	suspiciously	like	instrumentalism.	And	
since	any	answer	to	this	question	goes	beyond	quantum	mechanics	as	it	stands,	the	call	for	
explanation	involves	a	demand	to	supplement	quantum	mechanics,	or	to	replace	it	with	
something	more	fundamental.	
	 Of	course,	given	the	no-go	theorems,	the	path	to	an	explanation	of	the	structure	of	
quantum	facts	is	by	no	means	clear.	But	neither	do	the	no-go	theorems	show	that	an	
explanation	is	impossible	(Friederich	2015,	161).3	If	the	foregoing	is	correct,	then	pragmatism	is	
an	excellent	way	to	expose	the	foundational	problems	of	quantum	mechanics,	but	it	is	not	a	
means	to	dissolve	them.	
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